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Under the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures, a party that has been injured by a 
scofflaw state’s failure to comply with its trade obligations may retaliate against the 
scofflaw state by withdrawing equivalent trade concessions. Legal and economic 
commentators generally view retaliation as an economically perverse strategy for 
enforcing free trade norms. This Article explores an alternative explanation, arguing that 
retaliation may provide the optimal enforcement mechanism for trade liberalization given 
the prevalence of low compliance incentives and high enforcement costs in international 
cooperation agreements. This Article argues that retaliation is superior to other remedial 
options because it enables an injured state to inflict maximum political costs on the 
scofflaw state by mobilizing powerful export groups in the scofflaw state against 
protectionist policies. Furthermore, this Article shows how the presence of significant 
protectionist groups in the injured state, which stand to benefit from retaliatory measures, 
also improves the injured state’s ability to commit to retaliation. Even if states have 
asymmetric preferences about protectionist policies, however, retaliation threats can still 
be credible since there is uncertainty about each state’s retaliation costs. Finally, this 
Article concludes that contrary to the conventional wisdom, the substantial role of 
uncertainty in this model suggests that specific performance, and not compensation, ought 
to be the goal of the WTO’s enforcement mechanism.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most significant innovations of the 1994 Uruguay round of trade talks 
was the formalization of a dispute resolution or enforcement mechanism under the 
auspices of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).1 At the heart of this enforcement 
mechanism is the principle of retaliation or negative reciprocity. Specifically, the WTO 
authorizes states that are harmed by uncured rule violations to retaliate by suspending 
                                                 
∗ Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Bruce Johnsen, 
Alan Sykes, Adam Cox, James Spindler, Elizbeth Emens, Richard Epstein, Robert Howse and participants 
in a conference sponsored by the Cegla Center at Tel Aviv University on “The Role and Limits of Legal 
Regulation of Conflicts of Interest” held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
1 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15 1994, in World Trade 
Organization, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade  
equivalent “concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.”2 In other 
words, the enforcement strategy under the WTO is a tit-for-tat approach; if state A is 
found to breach its obligations to state B, and state A refuses to remedy the breach, state 
B can suspend an equivalent measure of its market access obligations to state A. 
Economists and legal scholars typically view retaliation as an economically 
perverse strategy for enforcing free trade norms.3 Indeed, retaliation seems to flout the 
most basic conflict of interest principles by making protectionist groups–the very enemies 
of free trade at home–the beneficiaries of the WTO’s remedial scheme. Understandably, 
these critics recommend that the current retaliation system be replaced by more trade 
friendly alternatives, such as mandatory monetary compensation or collectively-imposed 
sanctions.  
 This Article explores an alternative explanation of the retaliation mechanism, 
arguing that it provides the optimal enforcement strategy for trade liberalization given the 
prevalence of two major obstacles to international cooperation: low compliance 
incentives and high enforcement costs. By providing incentives for domestic interest 
groups to monitor violations and to follow through on enforcement threats, the 
retaliation mechanism perpetuates credibility in the WTO’s dispute resolution 
mechanism. Two major interest group dynamics characterize this enforcement strategy. 
First, retaliation increases compliance by mobilizing powerful interest groups in the 
scofflaw state—export interests—to fight against pro-protectionist policies. While other 
commentators have also observed this specific attribute of retaliation,4 they have not 
sufficiently analyzed its public choice features in the context of alternative remedial 
schemes. As a compliance strategy, targeting export groups for retaliation is optimal 
because it is self-enforcing and it exacts the maximum political costs on politicians in the 
                                                 
Negotiations (1999) (hereinafter WTO Agreement). Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement largely 
incorporates the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs of 1947. See General Agreement of Tariffs and 
Trade, October 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 UNTS 194 (hereinafter GATT).  
2 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Art.22.2, WTO 
Agreement (hereinafter DSU). 
3 For the critical commentary on the retaliation mechanism, see infra text accompanying notes 40-48. 
4See infra text accompanying note 22. 
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scofflaw state. In contrast, an alternative remedy like monetary compensation would not 
only lack a self-enforcing mechanism, it would also tend to deflect the costs of non-
compliance among a weak, widely dispersed, interest group. Other remedial alternatives, 
such as collective enforcement or suspension, are also inadequate either because they 
oversupply protectionist benefits or are simply not credible.  
Second, since retaliation provides a substantial benefit to protectionist groups in 
the injured country, it increases the credibility of enforcement threats. Ordinarily, threats 
by an injured country to retaliate against a scofflaw state by raising tariffs may lack 
credibility because retaliation imposes a welfare loss on the injured state. An injured state 
may nonetheless be willing to retaliate if retaliation enables it to meet the demands of a 
domestic protectionist audience. Thus, the presence of a politically significant 
protectionist group improves the injured state’s ability to commit to retaliation by making 
retaliation less political costly. Paradoxically, this interest group dynamic suggests a 
somewhat counterintuitive result: in a world where certain states have incentives to defect 
from their trade obligations, a state that faces significant domestic protectionist pressures might 
better serve the liberalization goals of the WTO because such a state can better signal its resolve 
to commit to a course of retaliation.   
An important feature of the foregoing framework is the role of uncertainty or 
asymmetric information, in which each state is uncertain about the other’s true political 
costs of retaliation. Were complete information available, a state with a strong 
protectionist domestic audience would have an incentive to breach its commitments to a 
state with a weak domestic protectionist audience. This is because a state that is less able 
to generate domestic political support for protectionist policies is less likely to commit 
itself to a long course of retaliation. Assuming a rational choice model, however, threats 
to retaliate may still be credible because it is very difficult for a state to observe the true 
political costs of retaliation to another state and certain states may have an incentive to 
misrepresent such costs. Thus, even if a particular state lacks a significant protectionist 
domestic audience, it may have a strong incentive to mimic the behavior of a state that 
does in order to deter prospective scofflaw states from breaching their international trade 
obligations.  
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The importance of uncertainty in this model suggests that, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, the goals of the WTO’s enforcement mechanism ought to be 
specific performance rather than compensation.5 Optimal deterrence occurs not 
necessarily when retaliation actually takes place, but when there is a threat to retaliate and 
there is considerable uncertainty about the political costs or benefits of retaliation to the 
injured state. Sustained non-compliance undermines this uncertainty feature, however, by 
enabling the scofflaw state to discern the injured state’s true preferences regarding 
retaliation. For instance, a scofflaw state would be able to discern that an injured state has 
high retaliation costs if the injured state is put to the test and is unable to retaliate for a 
sustained period of time. Because of this involuntary information disclosure, such an 
injured state may no longer have threats that are credible to deter the scofflaw state (or 
any other state) from future violations. This information-forcing role that is inherent in a 
compensation model of enforcement is potentially destabilizing to the free trade regime.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides some relevant background on the 
relationship between free trade agreements and domestic interest groups. Part II examines 
the tactical role that retaliation plays in using export groups to force politicians in the 
scofflaw state to internalize the costs of protectionist measures. This Part explores briefly 
other alternatives to retaliation, such as monetary compensation and group sanctions, and 
concludes that retaliation is superior to these alternatives as an enforcement strategy. Part 
III explores how, in the presence of uncertainty regarding a state’s domestic preferences, 
protectionist groups may influence a state’s ability to make credible enforcement threats. 
Part IV explores the role of uncertainty in the ongoing debate regarding the remedial 
goals of the WTO enforcement regime and concludes that specific performance is 
preferable to a compensation approach.  
 
I.  TRADE AGREEMENTS, RECIPROCITY, AND INTEREST GROUPS 
For many years, economists and political scientists have attempted to explain 
international cooperation as the result of the interaction of rational egoists acting to 
                                                 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 53-61. 
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maximize aggregate welfare or some other conception of the national interest.6 In these 
state-centered models, the role of domestic actors in formulating international trade 
policy was largely ignored. Recently, however, influenced by the insights of public choice 
theory, more commentators are beginning to explain international trade agreements in 
terms of the competition for influence by domestic interest groups.7 In this model, 
commentators do not pay much attention to states and political actors because they are 
regarded merely as tools for transmitting the preferences of dominant domestic interest 
groups.  
According to the interest group approach, states enter into international trade 
agreements not necessarily because they seek to maximize aggregate welfare but because 
they are responding to pressure from special industry interests. 8 Indeed, interest group 
theory predicts that politicians have very little incentive to focus on the interests of 
consumer groups that benefit from trade liberalization since such groups tend to lack 
political influence due to collective action problems. Rather, free trade agreements can be 
explained as the result of the emerging political influence of export-oriented groups 
seeking increased access to foreign markets. As more free trade agreements are signed, 
and the gains from liberalization are consolidated, the political power of these export-
oriented groups grows relative to that of protectionist groups.9 But since domestic 
protectionist groups still command significant political influence, very few free trade 
agreements completely liberalize trade. Rather, most free trade agreements provide for 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., John Kennan and Raymond Reizman, Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars, 29 INT’L ECON. REV. 
81 (1988); David A. Lake, Beneath the Commerce of Nations: A Theory of International Economic Structures, 
28 INT’L STUD. Q. 143 (1984); Stephen Krasner, State Power and the Structure of International Trade, 28 
WORLD POL. 317 (1976); Harry G. Johnson, Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation, 21 REV. ECON. STUD. 21 
(1954). For a detailed critique of the state-centered or structural approach see Timothy J. McKeown, The 
Limitations of “Structural” Theories of Commercial Policy, 40 INT’L ORG. 43 (1986). 
7 See e.g., Alan Sykes & Warren Schwartz, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution 
in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179, 194-95 (2002); ROBERT BALDWIN, THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF U.S. IMPORT POLICY (1996); Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protection for Sale, 84 
AMER. ECO. REV. 84, 84-86 (1994). For a more in depth comparison of the state-centered and interest 
group approaches see John Ikenberry, David Lake & Michael Mastunduno, Introduction: Approaches to 
Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy, 42 INT’L ORG. 1 (1988).  
8 See Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Trade Wars and Trade Talks, 103 J POL. ECON. 675, 676 
(1995).   
9 See Sykes & Schwartz, The Economic Structure, supra note 7 at 194-95. 
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some level of tariff protection and also provide for some safeguards, such as Article IX of 
the GATT, which enable states to grant temporary protection to ailing import-competing 
industries.10  
Both the empirical evidence and the institutional framework of international trade 
regimes support the interest group explanation of international trade agreements.11 For 
instance, the role of reciprocity in the international bargaining process suggests that most 
states treat access to their markets as precious assets that they are only willing to give up 
in exchange for equivalent access to foreign markets. This approach makes sense if we 
assume that politicians are willing to sacrifice political support from protectionist groups 
in return only for more substantive support from export interest groups. It does not make 
much sense, however, if one adopts the state-centered assumption that states only seek to 
maximize aggregate welfare. As economists concede, states simply seeking to maximize 
aggregate welfare would chose free trade as the dominant strategy regardless of the 
strategy of other states.12 But why then would states seek concessions in order to do what 
is ostensibly in their interests? As Paul Krugman has observed, the reciprocity approach to 
trade bargaining cannot be understood purely in economic terms: 
 
Anyone who has tried to make sense of international trade negotiations 
eventually realizes that they can only be understood by realizing that they are 
a game scored according to mercantilist rules, in which an increase in exports . 
. . is a victory, and an increase in imports . . . is a defeat. The implicit 
mercantilist theory does not make sense . . . but it nonetheless governs actual 
policy.13  
  
                                                 
10 See Alan Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with 
Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 259 (1991).  
11 See Robert E. Baldwin, The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Integrating the Perspectives of Economists 
and Political Scientists, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY (Feenstra et. al ed., 1996) (listing 
empirical studies providing support for interest group explanation of international trade policy).  
12 Paul Krugman, What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J ECON. LIT. 113, 113 (1997).  
13Id. at 114.  
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 The principle of reciprocity inherent in international trade negotiations also 
features elsewhere in the WTO/GATT legal system. For instance, under the 
renegotiation provision of Article XXVIII of the GATT, a state may propose to modify or 
withdraw a tariff to which it has previously agreed in a prior negotiation.14 If the state fails 
to reach an agreement with any state that would be affected by the proposed new tariff, 
however, it is free to make the change, but the affected states are allowed to withdraw 
substantially equivalent concessions. 15 
Finally, reciprocity also plays a role in the WTO’s enforcement mechanism. Under 
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), if a panel or appellate body 
concludes that a member has breached its obligations under a covered agreement, it will 
recommend that such a member “bring the measure into conformity with the 
agreement.”16 If the non-compliant member fails to conform within a reasonable period of 
time, then the DSU requires that such a member enter into negotiations over 
compensation with the injured member.17 The DSU makes it clear, however, that 
compensation is only be a temporary measure, and that compliance with the panel’s 
recommendations is the desired outcome.18 If negotiations over compensation fail, the 
injured member may request authority to suspend trade concessions “equivalent to the 
level of nullification and impairment.”19 Once again, however, the DSU clarifies that this 
                                                 
14 See GATT, supra note 1, art. XXVIII(2) (“In such negotiations and agreement . . . , the contracting 
parties concerned shall endeavour to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
concessions not less favourable to trade than that provided for in this Agreement prior to such 
negotiations.”).  
15 Id. at art XXVIII(3)(a) (“[T]he contracting party which proposes to modify or withdraw the 
concession shall, nevertheless, be free to do so and if such action is taken any contracting party with which 
such concession as initially negotiated . . . shall then be free . .. to withdraw . . . substantially equivalent 
concessions negotiated with the applicant contracting party.”).  
16 DSU, supra note 2, art. 19.1.  
17 Id. art. 22.2. 
18 Id. art. 22.1 (“Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary 
measures available in the event that recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable 
period of time. However, neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions is preferred to full 
implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements.”).  
19 Id. art. 22.4 
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retaliation remedy is temporary and should last only until the scofflaw member complies 
with the panel’s recommendations. 20  
 
II. EXPORT INTEREST GROUP LINKAGE IN ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 
The consequences of how the interaction of domestic interest groups affects the 
negotiation of international trade agreements has been elaborated on in a number of 
studies over the past couple of decades.21 But studies of how such interest groups affect 
the enforcement mechanism have been less developed. For instance, although there have 
been public choice studies on how retaliation encourages export groups to favor 
liberalization policies,22 such studies overlook any comparison of the efficacy of retaliation 
to alternative enforcement mechanisms. The following two sections argue that retaliation 
is superior to the myriad other remedial alternatives because it best forces the scofflaw 
state to internalize the political costs of non-compliance.  
 
A.   Retaliation as a Strategy for Mobilizing Export Groups against Protectionist 
Policies 
The key role that protectionist interest groups play in fomenting the violation of 
international trade agreements is well documented. Once one recognizes that domestic 
pressures provide politicians with incentives to renege on their prior international trade 
commitments, it becomes necessary to establish enforcement regimes of varying intricacy 
to handle these problems. Interestingly, one would expect that the best remedial strategy, 
from an economic point of view, would punish the protectionists responsible for the 
                                                 
20 Id. art. 22.1. 
21 See, e.g., Grossman and Helpman, supra note 7 at 111; Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, The 
Politics of Free Trade Agreements, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 667 (1995); Robert Baldwin & Richard Clarke, 
Game-modeling Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 9 J POL. MOD. 257 (1987). 
22 See , e.g., Judith Goldstein, International Institutions and Domestic Politics: GATT, WTO, and the 
Liberalization of Trade, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 133, 144-46 (Anne O. 
Krueger, ed. 1998); see also Mark Movsesian, Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).  
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breach and compensate the export interest groups that have been injured by the loss of 
trade concessions. But such a strategy overlooks a fairly insuperable obstacle: the 
sovereignty of the state parties to the agreement. In other words, the existence of 
intervening independent political institutions makes it fairly difficult for export interest 
groups from one state to influence directly the incentives of protectionist groups in 
another state.  
In view of the significant political access costs associated with the first-best 
solution, a second-best approach that takes account of the actual interest group dynamics 
that exist across sovereign borders is preferable. One such approach involves the strategic 
use of tariff schedules by the home state to mobilize export interest groups in a foreign 
state against protectionist groups within the same state. This is precisely the strategy 
embraced by the WTO’s enforcement mechanism. In other words, retaliation has the 
property of making political decisions that benefit protectionist interest groups directly 
adverse to the interests of domestic export interest groups.  
The political economy of retaliation involves the strategic interaction between 
domestic export interest groups and their foreign counterparts. This strategic interaction 
can be decomposed into two stages: 
 
1. The information production stage: this is when export interest groups in an 
injured state inform their politicians about a possible breach and attempt to 
lobby for a response.  
2. The response stage: This is when the export interest groups in the injured state 
lobby for targeted retaliation to inflict the most damage on strategic export 
interests in the scofflaw state. 
 
At the information production stage, the export interest groups perform an 
educational function by making politicians in the injured state aware of the possible 
breach of a trade obligation by the scofflaw state. To the extent the injury caused by the 
treaty-inconsistent behavior of a foreign state is concentrated on few export interests, 
they are likely to overcome collective action problems and lobby for a political response. 
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Politicians in the injured state who fail to respond to the scofflaw state’s breach of its 
trade commitments can expect to pay a heavy price in terms of lost political patronage by 
these export groups. Because consumers typically suffer from collective action problems, 
however, it is safe to assume that the politicians may be willing to impose welfare losses on 
consumers to satisfy the demands of export interest groups. But this does not mean that 
the optimal political choice will always be retaliation. For instance, an injured state may 
decide it is expedient to avoid or postpone retaliation, especially if it believes that less 
aggressive mechanisms—such as negotiation—may resolve the trade dispute. 
At the response stage, the politicians in the injured state have to decide how best 
to induce the politicians in the scofflaw state to comply with their trade commitments. It 
is safe to assume that export interest groups reward politicians not only when they 
institute retaliation, but also when they have successfully induced the scofflaw state to 
comply with its obligations. Politicians in the injured state will thus have an incentive to 
choose the optimal mix of retaliation strategies that will best mobilize the scofflaw state’s 
export interest groups against protectionism.  
Mobilization is not costless, however. Indeed, mobilization entails prevailing over 
collective action problems that can be fairly severe. Interest group theory teaches that the 
greater the concentration of an industry, the greater the likelihood that it will organize 
because the largest firms will bear a significant share of the benefits.23 Thus, if retaliation 
targets a wide range of industries, mobilization will be difficult because of free-rider 
problems. Therefore, the injured state has an incentive to engage in targeted retaliation 
and focus on a discrete group of powerful industries that it believes will put sufficient 
pressure on politicians in the scofflaw state. 
The EC’s approach in the recent dispute over steel tariffs with the United States 
illustrates this retaliation strategy. Citing injury to the United States steel industry from 
increased steel imports, in March 2002 the United States decided to impose 30 percent 
tariffs on most imported flat-rolled steel products and 15 percent tariffs on rebar and 
                                                 
23 For the discussion of the collective action difficulties faced by large and diffuse interest groups, see 
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 33-43 (1965). 
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stainless steel.24 The EC, Japan, Korea, and Brazil immediately filed a claim against the 
steel tariffs before the WTO arguing that they violated a variety of non-discriminatory 
WTO provisions. After prevailing before the WTO’s appellate body,25 the EC published a 
retaliation list that threatened sanctions against $2.2 billion worth of United States goods 
unless the United States lifted the steel tariffs by early December 2003.26 Of particular 
interest, however, was the political dynamics of the EC’s retaliation strategy. The EC 
understood that the disputed steel tariffs would help shore up political support for 
President Bush in certain swing states like West Virginia, Pennsylvania and Ohio. In 
response, the EC specifically targeted a range of industries for retaliation located in states 
that are likely to be political battlegrounds in the 2004 presidential election such as 
Florida, South Carolina, Washington, and North Carolina.27 For instance, as much as 100 
percent tariffs were going to be tacked unto certain goods like fruit juices, apples, dried 
vegetables, t-shirts, and other products from these battleground states. 28 The EC 
ostensibly put the President into a political dilemma: he could keep the steel tariffs and 
reap political spoils in Ohio and Pennsylvania, or he could face a political backlash from 
industries subject to retaliation in states like Florida. On the eve of the EC’s retaliation 
deadline, President Bush decided to scrap the steel tariffs.29  
The United States’ approach in the European Community (EC) Bananas case is 
also another example of the use of a politically calibrated retaliation strategy.30 In 1999, 
                                                 
24 See Presidential Proclamation No. 7529, March 5, 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 10553 (March 7, 2002).  
25 See WTO Appellate Body, United States--Definitive Safeguard Measures On Imports of Certain 
Steel Products, WT/DS248 /AB/R (adopted Dec. 10, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org. 
26 Actually a provisional retaliation list was released by the EC in the summer of 2002. See Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1031/2002 (June 13, 2002), available on http://europa.eu.int. 
27 See James Cox, Sparks Fly over U.S.-E.U. Trade, USA TODAY, Nov. 11, 2003, at A3 (discussing 
political benefits to George Bush of steel tariffs and the political sensitivity of threatened retaliation by the 
EC).  
28 See Council Regulation (EC) No 1031/2002 (June 13, 2002), available on http://europa.eu.int. 
29 See Bush Ends Steel Safeguard Tariffs in Face of Threat by EU to Retaliate, 20 Int’l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) 2021 (Dec. 11, 2003).  
30For the panel report on the EC-Bananas dispute, see WTO Panel Report on the European 
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 
1997). For the appellate body report, see WTO Report of the Appellate Body on the European 
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 
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the United States imposed 100 percent duties on a range of European imports worth $192 
million after the EC refused to conform its banana import regime to a WTO ruling. 31 In 
imposing these sanctions, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) deliberately 
targeted a range of key products from powerful European industrial sectors and imposed 
tariffs that were sufficiently high to preclude those products altogether from the American 
market.32 The list of products affected by the tariffs were very specific and were chosen by 
the USTR with input from interested members of the American business community. 
Thus, rather than imposing lower tariffs on a much wider range of products, which would 
have created collective action problems, the USTR focused on a narrower (but 
significant) cluster of industries, which would face less obstacles in organizing and 
applying political pressure on the scofflaw state’s politicians.  
Commentary and actions by politicians and business interests on both sides of the 
Atlantic suggests that the United States’ retaliation strategy in the EC Bananas dispute 
was quite effective. For instance, by early as mid-1999, Italy, which saw its lucrative hand-
bag industry shut-out from the American market by the prohibitive tariffs, was eager to 
settle the dispute.33 When compliance was not forthcoming initially, the United States 
Congress decided to up the ante and passed legislation in May 2000 that explicitly 
required the USTR to rotate retaliatory tariffs every 180 days if a country continues not to 
comply with WTO rulings.34 Shortly afterwards, the USTR proposed new EC products 
                                                                                                                                                 
1997). For an in-depth and detailed review of the controversy underlying this famous dispute, see Raj 
Bhala, The Bananas War, 31 MCGEORGE L REV 839 (2000).  
31See USTR Press Release 99-17, United States takes Customs Actions on European Imports (Mar. 3, 
1999), available at www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/03/99-60.pdf., (hereinafter USTR Bananas Press Release). 
For the DSU arbitration decision authorizing the United States to suspend concessions, see European 
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas European Communities—
Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WTO/DS27/ARB 
(April 9, 1999) (hereinafter EC-US Bananas Arbitration Decision). The United States picked the earlier 
date of March 3 to impose retaliatory measures because that was the date the arbitration panel’s decision 
was originally due. See Daniel Pruzin, US Blocks EU Request for Banana Panel While Hormone Beef Issue 
Simmers at WTO, 16 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 945 (June 2, 1999).  
32 See USTR Bananas Press Release, supra note 31. 
33 See James Blitz and Frances Williams, Italians Urge EU to Retreat in Banana Dispute with the U.S., 
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1990, at 6.  
34 This “carousel” sanctions plan was part of the African and Caribbean Trade Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-200, 114 Stat. 251 (2000), codified in various sections of 19 U.S.C. (2000).  
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that would be targeted by retaliation and sought comments as to whether the then 
existing 100 percent tariffs were high enough to induce compliance.35 Faced with even 
more concentrated prohibitive sanctions, the EC capitulated and decided to settle the 
dispute in 2001.36 
One significant caveat: the efficacy of a well-calibrated retaliation strategy may 
depend on whether it addresses primarily protectionist trade restrictions. To the extent a 
restrictive trade measure is multifaceted and substantially affects a broader range of other 
politically salient interest groups, then a retaliation remedy may be less effective. For 
instance, the United States and Canada recently adopted a fairly calibrated retaliation 
strategy in a dispute involving EC restrictions on the importation of hormone-treated beef 
products.37 But that strategy has hardly been effective in inducing compliance by the EC. 
One possible explanation is that the EC ban on hormone-treated beef might not be 
motivated mainly by protectionist reasons but by other factors, such as EC consumer 
preferences regarding the health effects of such products. But this limitation in the 
WTO’s enforcement mechanism does not necessarily prove that retaliation is an 
ineffective strategy; indeed, it might prove the opposite. One might argue, as many 
                                                 
35 See WTO: USTR Steps Up Pressure on EU to Comply with Beef and Banana Rulings, 17 INT’L 
TRADE REP. (BNA) 853 (June 1, 2000).  
36 See U.S. Trade Representative Announces the Lifting of Sanctions on European Products as EU 
Opens Market to U.S. Banana Distributors (July 1, 2001), USTR Press Release, available at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto/pp0701.htm; USTR Press Release 01-23, Joint United States—
European Union Press Release: U.S. Government and European Commissions Reach Agreement to Resolve 
Long-Standing Banana Dispute (Apr. 11, 2001). 
37 In 1999, after the EC refused to comply with a WTO ruling that its restrictions were inconsistent 
with the WTO’s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary Phytosanitary Measures (the “SPS” 
Agreement), the United States sought WTO authorization to retaliate. See European Communities–
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)—Recourse to Arbitration by the European 
Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999). After the WTO approved 
level of tariff suspensions worth $116.8 million, the United States imposed 100 percent retaliatory tariffs on 
a specific range of EC agricultural products. USTR Announces Final Product List in Beef Hormones 
Dispute, USTR Press Release, July 19, 1999, available at www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/07/99-60.pdf. 
(hereinafter USTR Beef Hormones Press Release). Interestingly, in deciding which items to target for 
retaliation, the United States also factored in the political influence of the EC member states producing the 
item. See Rosemary A. Ford, The Beef Hormone Dispute and Carousel Sanctions: A Roundabout Way of 
Forcing Compliance with World Trade Organization Decisions, 27 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L 543, 568 (2002) 
(observing that the United States “eventually scaled back the quantity of [pork] products targeted because 
it did not want to unfairly burden Denmark, the EU’s largest pork producer, as Denmark is a relatively small 
EU member state lacking large political influence.”). 
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commentators have suggested, that the WTO’s enforcement mechanism should only 
apply to trade restrictive measures that are primarily motivated by protectionism. 38 
Indeed, the WTO explicitly provides that members may adopt otherwise discriminatory 
measures for a variety of regulatory reasons provided such measures are not disguised 
protectionist barriers.39  
The foregoing analysis suggests that mobilizing core export interest groups through 
targeted retaliation is a key variable in promoting trade liberalization. Facing political 
pressure from domestic export groups, politicians in the injured state strategize as to how 
to mobilize export groups in order to exert the maximum political costs on the scofflaw 
state. The empirical evidence suggests that the politicians in the injured state often 
choose a retaliation strategy that applies prohibitively high tariffs to a discrete set of 
products from powerful export industries in the scofflaw state. This strategy accords with 
what public choice theory predicts, which is that concentrated industries that face 
disproportionately large costs or benefits from political decisions are better positioned to 
overcome collective action problems. 
 
B. Evaluating other Remedial Options 
By forcing politicians in the scofflaw state to internalize the costs of defecting from 
international trade commitments, retaliation has proven to be a fairly reliable 
enforcement strategy. Nonetheless, many commentators consider the emphasis on 
retaliation in international trade agreements as an obstacle to trade liberalization.40 For 
instance, some have argued that retaliation is a perverse enforcement device because it 
                                                 
38 See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can Foreign Policy 
Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. __(forthcoming 2003) (discussing scholarly literature on 
whether GATT only prohibits discriminatory trade barriers that are imposed for protectionist reasons).  
39 For instance, article XX of the GATT provides that members may adopt regulatory measures to 
“protect human, animal or plant life or health,” so long as these measures do not constitute “a disguised 
restriction on trade.” GATT, Octo. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.  
40 See, e.g., Kym Anderson, Peculiarities of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 
123, 128 (2002); Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792, 814-24 
(2002); Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle: Free Trade and the WTO, 77 INT’L AFF. 15, 28 (2001); Petros 
Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L 763, __ 
(2000); Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules—Toward a More 
Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 335, 346 (2000).  
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tends to hurt the injured state’s economy.41 Others argue that it helps entrench 
protectionist interests since it implicitly provides benefits to protectionist groups in the 
injured state rather than the export groups that have been harmed. 42 These 
commentators argue that other remedial options are likely to achieve better compliance. 
One remedial option widely endorsed by commentators involves the payment of a 
monetary fine to the injured state.43 Economists like monetary fines because unlike 
retaliation it does not impose any costs on the injured states and it could be used directly 
to compensate export interest groups harmed by trade inconsistent measures. 44  
One obvious limitation with the imposition of monetary fines is that it is not a 
self-enforcing remedy. In other words, unlike retaliation, the successful imposition of 
monetary fines depends on some affirmative act by the scofflaw state. A scofflaw states 
that is adjudicated in violation of its international trade commitments may simply refuse 
to pay. One way to get around this problem would be to set-up bonding arrangements 
where each state contributes a certain amount of money to meet any contingent 
obligations. But even this approach will have its limitations. For instance, determining the 
appropriate escrow amount for each state would be unduly complex and burdensome. 
Moreover, states that are cash-strapped may be unwilling or unable to meet their escrow 
obligations. Perhaps because of these difficulties, there are very few examples of 
international agreements that incorporate monetary fines as a remedy.  
A more significant problem with the monetary fine remedy is that such a measure 
is unlikely to have a disciplining effect on politicians in the scofflaw state because the 
burden of the fine is likely to be borne by diffuse weak groups. 45 A key feature of a good 
                                                 
41 See Anderson, supra note 40 at 128; Charnovitz, supra note 40 at 815-16; Mavroidis, supra note 40 at 
774.  
42 See Anderson, supra note 40 at 128. 
43 See Bhagwati, supra note 40 at 28; Marco Bronckers, More Power to the WTO? J. INT’L ECON. L. 41, 
62 (2001).  
44 See Bronckers, supra note 43 at 62; Pauwelyn, supra note 40 at 346.  
45 See Daryl Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional 
Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 374-78 (2000) (making the point that unlike private actors, governments are 
not necessarily deterred by compensation requirements because politicians can effectively shift the 
monetary costs to inert political groups).  
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enforcement strategy is its ability to mobilize another powerful domestic interest group 
against the interests of the disfavored interest group. A retaliatory strategy that focuses on 
the suspension of trade concessions possesses this feature, but monetary fines do not. In 
the case of monetary fines, it is a fairly dispersed group of taxpayers in the scofflaw state 
that is very likely pick up the tab. Ultimately, politicians facing mounting pressures by 
domestic protectionist groups to breach trade commitments are unlikely to be deterred by 
the prospect of having to pay fines from a general revenue fund.46 
A more nuanced approach would impose the fines directly on the protectionist 
groups that instigated the violation of the WTO obligation.47 But there is little reason to 
believe that this option is practically feasible. Such an approach will very likely encounter 
strong resistance from protectionist groups, which are more likely to overcome collective 
action problems than taxpayers. In the end, prudent politicians will try to raise funds from 
a source where there are least likely to encounter sustained political resistance, such as a 
general judgment fund financed by taxpayers.  
 Another remedial option involves the imposition of collective sanctions on the 
scofflaw state. For instance, Kenneth Abbott has suggested that the WTO adopt a 
community sanction approach that would “authoriz[e] the suspension of concessions by 
however many contracting parties and in whatever amounts are thought necessary to 
induce compliance or to punish bad faith.”48 Again, this approach is problematic because 
it will very likely result in the oversupply of protectionist benefits. Third-party states that 
are not harmed by a breach will be susceptible to incentives to choose a retaliation 
strategy that benefits their domestic protectionist groups rather than one that induces 
compliance. This is because export interests groups in a third-party state are likely to be 
indifferent to the outcome of the dispute since they are not affected by the breach. 
However, politicians in such a state are likely to view an enforcement award as an 
                                                 
46 See Levinson, supra note 45 at 377.  
47 See Pauwelyn, supra note 40 at 346 (“To ensure that the sector or industry that suffers the damage 
caused by a WTO-inconsistent measure actually benefits from the compensation, one could, alternatively, 
force the losing member to pay an amount of money equivalent to the damage caused.”). 1 
48 Kenneth Abbott, GATT as a Public Institution: The Uruguayan Round and Beyond, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L 
L. 31, 65 (1992). 
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opportunity to satisfy the demands of their domestic protectionist constituencies. But 
there is no reason to believe that the retaliation strategy chosen by the politicians in the 
third party state would be the same as one chosen by a state seeking to induce 
compliance. Thus, a collective sanction approach would likely increase the overall level of 
trade-distorting policies without providing any offsetting liberalization benefits. A bilateral 
retaliation scheme avoids this problem because export interest groups in the injured state 
will likely lobby for a retaliation strategy that maximizes political pressure on the scofflaw 
state. 
 
III. PROTECTIONIST GROUPS AS CREDIBILITY AGENTS IN THE WTO’S ENFORCEMENT 
MECHANISM 
A rational state considering defection from an international trade agreement has 
to consider not only the potential consequences but also the probability of retaliation. In 
other words, such a state will have a greater incentive to defect if it believes that 
retaliation is not consistent with the interests of the injured party. But since potentially all 
states face welfare losses when they suspend trade concessions, one might wonder why we 
do not see more defections in international trade agreements. This Part suggests that one 
reason is that protectionist groups in the injured state, who stand to benefit from 
retaliatory measures, act as credibility agents in the WTO’s enforcement scheme. The 
first section assumes that each state is willing to impose deadweight losses on consumers 
in order to placate powerful protectionist interest groups. In such a situation, protectionist 
groups improve the injured state’s ability to commit to retaliation in a way that export 
groups are not able to do. The next section concludes that given uncertainty about 
retaliation costs, threats to retaliate may still be credible even where states have varying 
levels of commitment to protectionist policies. 
 
A. The Dynamics of Interest Groups in Generating Retaliation Credibility  
States that enter into international trade agreements ordinarily expect a 
significant degree of compliance from each other. But such agreements usually present a 
cooperative dilemma because states often face domestic pressures to violate their 
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international trade commitments. This feature of international trade agreements has 
influenced trade scholars to analyze trade cooperation as a prisoner’s dilemma game, in 
which each state has an incentive to cheat but where cooperation is preferable to mutual 
defection.49 In the end, cooperation is only feasible because trade agreements are open-
ended bargains where the relationship among the parties is like a repeated game of 
infinite duration.50 Since such repeated games provide parties with an opportunity to 
retaliate in future periods, the parties have an incentive to cooperate.   
  Clearly, the utility of a reciprocal strategy to enforce free trade commitments 
depends in large part on the belief of the parties that a threat to retaliate is credible. If 
state A knows that retaliation is a very costly for State B, state A’s strategy would be to 
breach all its future trade commitments to State B. Under what conditions would 
retaliation be a credible option for an injured state?  
The answer seems to depend on certain interest group dynamics inherent in 
international trade agreements. In other words, in order for retaliation to be a credible 
strategy for state A, politicians in that state have to be willing to sacrifice the welfare 
interests of their constituents for the benefit of a more well-organized interest group that 
favors retaliation. One obvious pro-retaliation candidate would be the export interest 
groups that have been injured by the violation of the trade agreement. Indeed, as 
demonstrated in Part II, such export groups play a critical role in mobilizing politicians to 
retaliate against scofflaw nations. 51 
Reliance on political pressure from export interest groups alone, however, would 
very likely result in a suboptimal retaliation strategy. To shed light on why this is the case, 
it would be helpful to view the interaction between a scofflaw state and an injured state in 
the post-judgment phase as representing a war of attrition. In a typical war of attrition 
                                                 
49 See Alan Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Economic Relations: The Limited Case 
for Section 301, 23 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 263, 273-74 (1992); Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's 
Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International Trade, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501, 503-04 (1985). 
50 See Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats, supra note 49 at 274 (observing that in such games of 
infinite durations “the players then can threaten to respond to a breach of the agreement by the other party 
with some sort of retaliatory breach strategy, and this threat can be forever effective as a deterrent, because 
the game is never expected to end soon.”) 
51 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 23-41. 
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model, each state tries to hold out for some benefit with the expectation that the other 
side will eventually concede.52 Holding out, however, imposes significant costs on both 
parties. In the end, the state that first reaches its breaking point loses the game. 
The depiction of the post-judgment phase of the interaction among disputing 
states as a war of attrition model is useful for a variety of reasons. First, the scofflaw state 
fits the war of attrition model because it will suffer from retaliation costs the longer it 
holds out against conforming to its trade obligations. If the scofflaw state is indifferent to 
the retaliation costs, then it has no breaking point and the injured state’s strategy is 
irrelevant. If we assume, however, that the scofflaw state is unwilling to bear the costs of 
retaliation indefinitely, then it has an incentive to engage in a war of attrition against the 
injured state only if it believes that the injured state also has a breaking point.   
Second, the injured state will fit the war of attrition model if it relies only on 
export group pressure because it will then also have a breaking point. To illustrate why 
this is so, assume that both consumers and export interest groups in an injured state are 
willing to invest some positive political expenditure to influence a retaliation outcome. 
Let the consumers’ political expenditure (against retaliation) equal c and the export 
interest groups’ expenditure (for retaliation) equal e. In the post judgment phase, at time t 
= 0, it is safe to assume that e > c > 0 because export groups would be better able to 
overcome collective action problems than consumer groups. But for these export interest 
groups, the level of expenditure that they are willing to invest at any specific time is a 
function of their beliefs regarding the probability of compliance by the scofflaw state. In 
other words, if the export groups believe that the scofflaw state is unlikely to comply even 
in the face of retaliation, they would be less willing to invest in retaliation. In turn, the 
export groups’ belief about the scofflaw state’s probability of compliance is also a function 
of the amount of time the scofflaw state spends not complying. We would expect that the 
longer the scofflaw state holds out, the greater the likelihood that it will never comply. At 
                                                 
52 For a discussion of the war of attrition model, see DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 
119-26 (1991). For some applications of the war of attrition model to legal regimes, see Nicolas Marceau & 
Steeve Mongrain, Damage Averaging and the Formation of Class Action Suits, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 63 
(2003); James Morrow, The Laws of War, Common Conjectures, and Legal Systems in International Politics, 31 
J. LEGAL STUD. 41 (2002).  
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time tn,, where e = c, the political costs and benefits of retaliation to the injured state are 
now equal and the injured state would have reached its breaking point. In other words, at 
time tn , which is when the injured state will concede the game if the scofflaw state has not 
already done so, the export groups’ marginal happiness from retaliation is now equal to 
the consumers’ marginal resentment. Figure 1 below is a simple graphical depiction of the 
injured state’s breaking point when only export groups are investing political expenditures 
in favor of retaliation.  
 
Level of political expenditure 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
     tn    Time of non-compliance 
 
FIGURE 1: The Injured State’s Breaking Point in War of Attrition 
 
Let us change the model and assume that the injured state also has significant 
protectionist groups that would also benefit from retaliation. Assume further that the 
protectionists are willing to invest a level of political expenditure equal to p to support 
retaliation against the scofflaw state. If we assume that the protectionist interest groups 
are better positioned to overcome collective action problems than consumers, then p > c. 
Moreover, since protectionists stand to benefit from retaliatory tariffs regardless of 
whether or not the scofflaw state complies, the level of p is likely to remain constant over 
time. Thus, the total marginal political expenditure in favor of retaliation in the injured 
state = p + e. In this picture, the injured state no longer has a breaking point because it 
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would be willing to commit to retaliation indefinitely. In other words, even though 
politicians in the injured state still incur political costs from holding out, such costs are 
offset by the political benefits they obtain from protectionist groups. Figure 2 depicts the 
marginal political expenditure in favor of retaliation in the injured state when significant 
protectionist interest groups are present. 
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 FIGURE 2: The Injured State’s Political Expenditure with Protectionist Groups  
 
The foregoing analysis shows that a domestic political environment has significant 
implications for the strategic interactions among states at the enforcement phase of an 
international trade dispute. If a scofflaw state has a breaking point but it believes that the 
injured state does not have one because of significant protectionist pressures, then it has 
strong incentives to comply even before the injured state retaliates. In other words, the 
presence of a significant protectionist group in the injured state improves the injured 
state’s ability to influence the compliance incentives of the scofflaw nation. This dynamic 
interaction suggests a somewhat paradoxical result: the presence of strong protectionist 
groups in potential injured states may be instrumental in generating credibility in the WTO’s 
enforcement mechanism.  
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B.  Asymmetric Retaliation Costs and the Role of Uncertainty 
The analysis in the previous section assumed a condition in which states value the  
interests of protectionist groups over those of consumers who are harmed by import 
restrictive policies. While this may represent the political reality in many major 
democracies, the actual commitment of political actors to protectionist policies varies 
across states. There are two major reasons why we might expect political actors to 
sometimes value the welfare interests of consumers over those of protectionist interest 
groups.  
First, politicians in non-democratic states that do not face electoral constraints 
may have less of an incentive to value the interests of protectionist groups.53 Second, and 
more significantly, certain consumer groups in democratic states may be able to overcome 
collective action problems and become more politically potent than protectionist groups. 
This latter situation is likely to be the case consumer groups consists of industrial 
concerns that import many of their inputs. For instance, the unilateral repeal of 
agricultural tariffs by the British government in the nineteenth century has been largely 
attributed to the pressure of a well-organized coalition of industrial concerns that favored 
free trade policies. 54 More recently, in various WTO disputes, industrial consumer groups 
in the United States and the European Community have strongly lobbied against 
retaliation measures that would raise the costs of their inputs.55  
With complete information regarding each state’s preference for protectionist 
policies, states might be able to foresee what would happen if they breached their free 
                                                 
53 In such states, the significance of interest group pressure on political actors is much more ambiguous 
and hard to predict. For instance, Robert Putnam described a Yugoslav negotiator who, referring to the late 
dictator, Marshall Josip Tito, said, “the [leader] can always influence opinion if [he] wants to.” Robert 
Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the logic of two-level games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 451 (1988). 
54 See Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, Lessons in Lobbying for Free Trade in 19th Century Britain: To 
Concentrate or Not, 85 AM. POL. SC. REV. 37, 43 (1991); Gary Anderson & Robert Tollison, Ideology, 
Interest Groups and the Repeal of the Corn Laws, 141 J INST’L AND THEORETICAL ECON. 197 (1985).  
55 See Raj Bhala, The Bananas War, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 839, 951 (2000) (observing that American 
importers during the Bananas’ dispute “chafed at the uncertainty created by the [retaliation] carousel 
mechanism, and at the prospect of suffering heavy losses, even insolvency, as a result of retaliatory tariffs”); 
Geoff Winestok, How One Trade Dispute Fuels Another: U.S. Steel Tariffs May Stiffen EU Opposition to 
Tax Breaks, WALL ST. J., March 12, 2002, at A18 (observing that in WTO dispute over United States 
foreign sale company tax regime, EC consumers and importers were against any sanctions against the 
United States that would raise their costs).  
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trade commitments. Significantly, since the credibility of a retaliation threat depends 
largely on the existence of a strong domestic constituency that favors retaliation, states 
that do not face such pressures would be at a strong tactical disadvantage in enforcing 
their trade agreements. For instance, state A might recognize that state B would be 
unwilling to commit to a long course of retaliation if it knows that state B lacks a 
comparatively strong domestic protectionist constituency. In such a framework, states 
with low retaliation costs would have in an incentive to breach their commitments to 
states with high retaliation costs.  
In reality, however, such complete information about each state’s preferences is 
highly unlikely. Indeed, the problem of uncertainty or asymmetric information in 
international relations has received considerable attention from political scientists over 
the past couple of years.56 In international economic relations, each state that participates 
in trade negotiations is likely to be uncertain about the true domestic interest preferences 
of other states.57 The presence of uncertainty provides an incentive for each state to 
understate its costs of retaliation by exaggerating the power of domestic protectionist 
interests. Thus, a state that may be relatively indifferent to protectionist policies may 
pretend that it faces strong protectionist pressures in order to signal its resolve to retaliate 
in the event of a breach. Political scientists and economists have argued that such bluffing 
strategies are common among states seeking a bargaining advantage in international 
negotiations.58 
                                                 
56 See, e.g., Gerald Schneider & Lars-Erik Cederman, The Change of Tide in Political Cooperation: A 
Limited Information Model of European Integration, 48 INT’L ORG. 633 (1994) (focusing on states’ incentives 
to defect from European union); Keisuke Iida, When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level 
Games with Uncertainty, 37 J CONF. RES. 403 (1993) (focusing on domestic group preferences during 
peacetime diplomatic negotiations); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & David Lalman, Domestic Opposition and 
Foreign War, 84 AM POL. SCI. REV. 747 (1990) (focusing on domestic resistance to war). This emphasis on 
asymmetric preferences in international relations has not escaped the attention of legal commentators. See, 
e.g., Howard F. Chang, Carrots, Sticks, and International Externalities, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 309 (1997) 
(developing a model with asymmetric information where threats to harm global environment may be 
credible). 
57 See Iida, supra note 56 at 411-12.  
58 See Putnam, supra note 53 at 452; Chang, supra note 56 at 315; see also Sanford Grossman & Motty 
Perry, Sequential Bargaining under Assymetric Information, 39 J. ECON. THEORY 120 (1986).  
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Given the incentives that states have to misrepresent their true preferences 
regarding domestic restraints, it is reasonable to expect other states to attempt to unmask 
such tactical smokescreens. Indeed, one might expect that in democratic regimes, the 
ability of politicians to exploit private information regarding the influence of domestic 
constituencies would be limited. But there are many reasons why certainty about the true 
preferences of democratic states may still remain elusive.  
First, politicians in a democratic state may be able to influence patterns of 
mobilization among interest groups through legislation or by manipulating institutional 
rules.59 Second, it is not just the size and concentration of interest groups that matters, but 
their political clout vis a vis other groups. An interest group’s political clout usually 
depends on two factors: (1) the intensity of the interest group’s pressures and; (2) the 
ability of politicians to withstand such pressures. But none of these two factors is likely to 
be observed correctly by foreign states. Indeed, it is not clear that even domestic political 
insiders will have the ability to measure the relative political clout of interest groups 
before the actual outcome of a political bargain.60 In any event, attempts by foreign states 
to discern the relative political clout of domestic interest groups in international 
negotiations have often proven to be unsuccessful. For instance, Robert Putnam describes 
the futility of American efforts to understand German interest groups dynamics in the 
                                                 
59 See e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax 
Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 502, 504 (1998) (arguing that budget rules in “pay as you go” 
provision are a “mechanism to harness the interest group activity … in order to reach substantive tax goals 
more easily”). For an instance of politicians manipulating institutional rules in order to mobilize interest 
groups, see Helen Milner, The Interaction of Domestic and International Politics: The Anglo-American Oil 
Negotiations and in the International Civil Aviation Negotiations, 1943-1947 in EVANS ET. AL. ED., DOUBLE 
EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 207, 217 (1993) (suggesting 
that altering the status of an oil accord from an executive agreement subject to Senate ratification enlarged 
the power of parties opposed to the accord and subsequently doomed the accord). Indeed, political actors 
have an incentive to manipulate the division of foreign affairs powers in order to maximize political leverage 
against foreign states. This is especially relevant since courts in the United States seem reluctant to 
intervene in disputes regarding the constitutional allocation of foreign affairs powers. See generally Jide 
Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L REV. (forthcoming 2004).  
60 It is worthwhile noting that one of the most pronounced criticisms of interest group theory in 
international relations is that it lacks a framework for measuring interest group power and thus lacks 
predictive value. See John Ikenberry et al., Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic 
Policy,42 INT’L ORG. 1, 8 (1988).  
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wake of the 1978 Bonn negotiations to deal with global reflation.61 In that episode, both 
the German and the Americans seemed to face great difficulties in understanding each 
other’s domestic politics even though they were both major democracies with relatively 
transparent political institutions. 
In the context of WTO’s enforcement regime, uncertainty about a state’s 
domestic preferences becomes a strategic tool which helps improve the credibility of 
retaliation threats. To understand the role of uncertainty in this picture, let us assume 
that a scofflaw state knows its own private costs for non-compliance, but is unaware of 
the retaliation costs of the other state. If the scofflaw state’s costs for non-compliance are 
very low relative to the political benefits it receives, it may be willing to hold out 
indefinitely. One such scenario would be where the domestic protectionist pressures on 
the scofflaw nation are so great that the politicians invariably cave in to their demands. In 
such a case, the injured state’s retaliation costs are irrelevant because no threat of any 
duration is likely to deter the scofflaw state.  
If we assume, however, that the scofflaw state has a definable breaking point, then 
it would have a different non-compliance strategy. In deciding whether to breach its 
commitments, the potential scofflaw state has to weigh two different risks: (1) the risk 
that the injured state has no breaking point because of the presence of significant 
domestic groups that would always benefit from retaliation, and; (2) the risk that the 
injured state has a breaking point but might nevertheless win the war of attrition game. 
The problem is that the scofflaw state has no basis for determining the injured state’s true 
retaliation costs or breaking point ex ante. For its part, the injured state always has an 
incentive to pretend that it derives large benefits from retaliation and that the welfare 
costs it incurs from high tariffs are politically insignificant. Thus, given the presence of 
uncertainty, a retaliation threat by a state with a weak protectionist audience may 
nevertheless be credible. 
 
                                                 
61 See Putnam, supra note 53 at 452. As Putnam observes, “‘[g]overnments generally do not do too well 
in analyzing each other’s internal politics in crises [and I would add in normal times], and indeed it is 
inherently difficult.’” Id. (quoting GLENN H. SNYDER & PAUL DIESING, CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS: 
BARGAINING, DECISION MAKING, AND SYSTEM STRUCTURE IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES 522-23 (1977)). 
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C. The Special Case of Developing Countries 
One possibility is that this paper’s emphasis on retaliation as an enforcement 
strategy is misplaced with respect to developing countries. Such countries, many 
commentators and diplomats argue, lack the requisite market power to utilize retaliation 
effectively against more powerful trading units like the United States or the EC.62 More 
significantly, some of these commentators argue, developing states fear that they may be 
subject to future sanctions in other foreign policy spheres if they retaliate against more 
powerful trading partners.63 
At first blush, the argument that developing countries face a disadvantage in 
enforcing their free trade benefits seems rather straightforward. Since developing states 
lack market power, the argument goes, their ability to induce developed states to comply 
with their trade obligations through retaliation is very limited.64 But upon further 
examination, however, it is not obvious why developing states would necessarily be 
subject to higher retaliation costs than developed states. The domestic political economy 
incentives for states to retaliate vary considerably. The fact that one developing state (or 
one developed state) may have found it difficult to retaliate in one particular dispute, 
such as Ecuador in the EC Bananas dispute,65 tells us very little about how other 
developing states might react in other disputes. Other developing states could have 
relatively strong protectionist audiences that might otherwise make retaliation a 
politically desirable option. As Bhagwati and Panagariya have recently observed, poorer 
countries have on the average higher protectionist barriers to trade than rich countries.66 
What this observation suggests is that the political economy factors that make retaliation 
                                                 
62 See Douglas Ierley, Defining the Factors that Influence Developing Country Compliance with and 
Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Another Look at the Dispute over Bananas, 33 LAW & 
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 615, 640 (2002). 
63 Id.  
64 See id.  
65 See infra text accompanying notes 68-71.  
66 Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya, Wanted: Jubilee 2010 Against Protectionism, Washington 
University Department of Economics Working Paper (International Trade Series), Working Paper 
0308017, http://www.econwpa.wustl.edu , accessed Dec. 27, 2003) (discussing evidence showing that poor-
country protection is higher than rich-country protection).  
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politically attractive to certain interest groups in developed states are also likely to be 
present in many developing states. Indeed, recent empirical data on the role of developing 
countries in WTO dispute settlement suggests that developing countries are not at all 
disadvantaged in their ability to threaten retaliation against other states.67 
 A more plausible explanation for the reservation many developing countries might 
have about retaliation is the relative lack of choice these developing states face with 
respect to retaliation targets. In other words, developing countries may face a narrower 
range of options concerning products from developed states and many of those options 
may not even be politically salient industries in the developed state. Moreover, if a 
developing country’s imports from a developed county consists largely of capital inputs for 
industries, then it is highly unlikely that that the developing state will possess the 
requisite domestic political audience that will support retaliation.  
The relative lack of choice of products for retaliation from developed states does 
not mean that developing countries are always disadvantaged in enforcing their trade 
commitments. Indeed, the availability of cross-retaliation as a remedy suggests that 
developing countries may be narrowing any enforcement gap with developed states, to the 
extent such an enforcement gap exists. The efficacy of cross-retaliation as an enforcement 
strategy was recently demonstrated by Ecuador in the EC-Bananas dispute. After the 
WTO ruled that the EC’s regime for the importation of Bananas violated numerous 
GATT and GATS provisions,68 Ecuador sought the right to suspend concessions against 
the EC.69 In its retaliation request, however, Ecuador argued that since most of its imports 
from the EC consisted of capital goods and raw materials that were essential to its 
economy, it could not afford to impose any retaliatory sanctions in the goods sector.70 
Instead, Ecuador requested authority under Article 22 of the DSU to cross-retaliate by 
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suspending various obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In an unprecedented move, the DSU eventually 
granted Ecuador’s request to suspend concessions worth $202 million, with the proviso 
that up to $141.6 million could be in the form of suspended intellectual property rights 
under the TRIPS agreement.71 In the end, the EC decided to settle its dispute with 
Ecuador.  
Ecuador’s experience with cross-retaliation illustrates one innovative response to 
the perceived enforcement gap between developing and developed states. Mexico has 
proposed another: that developing countries should have the option of auctioning off 
their retaliation rights to states that can benefit from them.72 The problem with Mexico’s 
suggestion, however, is that it is prone to the same pathologies as a group sanction 
remedy.73 If state A, which has been harmed by a trade inconsistent measure by state B, 
auctions off its retaliation rights to state C, then state C will not have much have an 
incentive to choose a retaliation strategy that induces compliance. Since state C has not 
itself been harmed by trade inconsistent measures, it is unlikely to be subject to a 
domestic political audience that wants the trade inconsistent measure removed. Instead, 
state C is more likely to choose a retaliation strategy that would maximize benefits to its 
domestic protectionist audience. But the problem is that a retaliation strategy that 
maximizes benefits for a domestic protectionist audience is not necessarily the same 
strategy that would induce compliance. Thus, with a regime that permits states to auction 
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off retaliation rights, one is very likely to increase the level of protectionist benefits 
without any offsetting incentives for increased compliance.  
Finally, the related concern that developed countries may take action against 
developing states that exercise their retaliation rights is a red herring.74 Regardless of what 
enforcement mechanism that is in place, developed states may still act against developing 
states if the ultimate goal is to discourage developing states from vindicating their WTO 
rights. This concern has much more to do with the general asymmetric nature of the 
relationship between developed and developing states, however, than it has to do with 
any specific shortcomings of the retaliation remedy. 
 
IV. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND THE HAZARDS OF INFORMATION-FORCING DEVICES 
Given the centrality of uncertainty to the WTO’s enforcement mechanism, the 
question remains: what kind of remedial goals should it have? Some economic and legal 
commentators have generally argued that the goal of the system is compensation and not 
specific performance.75 More interestingly, these commentators have argued that the 
WTO endorses the notion of an efficient breach, which suggests that the WTO rules do 
not deter the breach of an underlying trade agreement where the breach offers a pareto 
superior outcome.76 This Part challenges this view and argues that the injection of 
contractual notions of efficient breach into the WTO remedial scheme is erroneous. 
Section A suggests first that as a descriptive matter, contractual concepts like efficient 
breach or compensation do not fit well in an environment where there is no higher 
sovereign that can compel parties to observe their contractual obligations. The second 
part of the argument is more normative: given the role of uncertainty in the WTO 
enforcement mechanism, specific performance rather than compensation better reflects 
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the trade liberalizing goals of the WTO. Section B explores the role of reciprocity in 
WTO regime as the strict exchange of equivalent benefits and suggests that such 
equivalence is grounded in customary international law norms and does not reflect an 
endorsement of efficient breach principles. 
 
A. The Limitations of Efficient Breach and Other Contract Principles in the WTO’s 
Enforcement Mechanism 
Many legal and economic commentators tend to employ contractual terms like  
damages and efficient breach in describing the remedial goals of the WTO’s enforcement 
mechanism.77 But trying to understand international trade agreements in such contractual 
terms is wrong, or is at least somewhat misleading. Agreements and disputes among states 
in the international realm are very much different from those in the domestic legal 
context. As Robert Hudec once observed, “international legal arrangements have 
relatively more in common with the law of primitive societies studied by anthropologists, 
in which litigation is still emerging as a tenuous alternative to dispute resolution by 
force.”78 Hudec’s observation helps explain why so many domestic contractual concepts 
may have little or no relevance in international law.  
Take the equitable remedy of specific performance, for instance. In a domestic 
legal setting, the efficacy of specific performance depends on the existence of a judicial 
order—backed by the coercive authority of the state—that compels a promisor to perform 
his contractual promise. In the realm of international law, however, there is no higher 
sovereign that can compel scofflaw states to meet their contractual obligations. As Judith 
Bello notes, “the WTO has no jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue helmets, no 
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truncheons or tear gas.”79 Bello’s observation is also true of most, if not all, international 
institutions responsible for implementing or monitoring international agreements. In 
theory, any state is almost always free to breach any of its international commitments, 
provided it is willing to incur the relevant reputational costs and/or face retaliation. In 
other words, unlike courts in domestic contract disputes, international institutions lack 
the mechanism to impose sanctions harsh enough that a promisor will always chose 
performance over non-compliance.80 This particular reality about inter-state cooperation 
is not a mere feature of institutional design, but is inherent in the very nature of 
international legal environment. For this reason, debates about whether a particular 
international legal regime endorses specific performance or compensation are largely 
misplaced. The international legal system is simply not developed enough for one to make 
such nuanced legal distinctions.  
Given the limitations of in the international legal order, a coherent positivist 
analysis of the remedial goals of the WTO that employs contract analogies seems unlikely. 
A different, but related, inquiry could take a more normative approach: if we assume that 
the WTO’s goals are to promote trade liberalization among its members, would specific 
performance or compensation better accomplish those goals?  
The answer depends on the incentives generated by each remedial scheme. 
Generally, much of the scholarly commentary on contract remedies has focused on the 
award of damages or compensation.81 At the heart of the damages regime is the notion of 
the efficient breach, which recognizes that there are circumstances in which breaching 
rather than performing a contract may make one party better off, without making the 
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other worse off. The efficiency of this approach is seriously open to question, however, in 
the context of international trade agreements. 
First, the efficient breach approach seems inappropriate when applied to the 
WTO context because it can eliminate or substantially undermine the uncertainty that is 
inherent in trade disputes and negotiations, rendering retaliation ineffective as an 
enforcement mechanism. As discussed in Part II, uncertainty about each state’s 
retaliation costs increases the chance that retaliation will be an effective deterrent.82 This 
is because a scofflaw state is more likely to capitulate if it believes that there is an ex ante 
possibility–even if it is never brought to fruition–that it will suffer sustained non-
compliance costs. However, scofflaw states that refuse to comply with the DSU 
recommendations in the face of retaliation can undermine this uncertainty by forcing an 
injured state to reveal its true retaliation costs. In the absence of uncertainty, potential 
scofflaw states will have an incentive to defect whenever the political costs of retaliation 
to the injured state are high enough to make sustained retaliation unlikely.  
Ecuador’s retaliation dilemma in the EC Bananas dispute underscores the 
significant role of uncertainty in the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism and how non-
compliance undermines that role. By putting Ecuador to the test, the EC was able to 
demonstrate that Ecuador had significant retaliation costs, thus undermining Ecuador’s 
ability to issue credible retaliation threats in future trade disputes within the GATT 
regime. In public choice parlance, Ecuador’s politicians revealed a political preference for 
consumer interests over those of protectionist groups. In the end, however, the 
availability of a cross-retaliation option improved Ecuador’s leverage and it showed that it 
was still capable of making credible retaliation threats when its WTO obligations are 
breached by a scofflaw state, especially when the scofflaw state has significant intellectual 
property interests. 
Second, an efficient breach or compensatory approach is also an inappropriate fit 
for the WTO’s enforcement scheme because retaliation does not compensate the injured 
party in a trade dispute. In domestic contract disputes, the efficiency rationale for the 
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efficient breach approach is that it provides expectation damages to the promisee while 
simultaneously allowing the promisor to reap any profits that exceed the losses to the 
promisee.83 In the international trade context, however, the remedy of retaliation does 
not provide any compensation or damages to the parties injured by the breach—the 
export interest groups in the injured state. For such export interest groups, retaliation is 
only a useful remedial device if it induces specific performance. Indeed, far from 
compensating the injured parties, retaliation actually tends to hurt the injured state, as 
Ecuador’s experience in the EC-Bananas’ dispute illustrates. And although protectionist 
interest groups may benefit from retaliatory actions, such benefits are clearly incidental to 
the goals of the WTO’s enforcement mechanism. In the end, the objective of retaliation 
is not to compensate protectionist interest groups, but to induce compliance by scofflaw 
states. Indeed, various provisions of the DSU make it clear that compliance with the 
recommendations of the DSB is required.84 And while the DSU does provide for 
negotiated compensation among the disputants, it seems clear that such compensation is 
simply an alternative to retaliation but not to compliance.85  
Recent WTO decisions and actions by WTO members support the notion that 
the WTO’s enforcement mechanism establishes a preference for specific performance 
rather than compensation. For instance, arbitrators adjudicating various retaliation 
proposals in WTO disputes have made it clear that the objective of retaliation is to ensure 
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compliance by the non-conforming state.86 Indeed, these arbitrators have acknowledged 
that in the absence of such compliance “the enforcement mechanism of the WTO 
dispute settlement system could not function properly.”87  
More importantly, the actors in the various disputes have also acted as if specific 
performance was the goal of the WTO’s remedial mechanism. In both the Bananas and 
Beef Hormones disputes, for instance, the EC did not take the position that it could 
breach its obligations indefinitely as long as it was willing to face sanctions. Indeed, prior 
to the eventual settlement of the Bananas dispute, the EC specifically agreed to bring its 
regime into compliance,88 and subsequently insisted that it had actually done so by 
making regulatory changes to it bananas import regime.89 The United States, for its part, 
argued that retaliation in the Bananas dispute was only a last resort measure designed to 
induce compliance by the EC.90 Indeed, the United States was so incensed by the EC’s 
non-compliance and delay tactics in that dispute that it also considered the unusual 
remedy of suspending the landing rights of European airlines.91 This is hardly the kind of 
remedial option a party would consider in the context of a compensatory regime. In the 
Beef Hormones dispute, the EC’s position has been that the WTO’s ruling allows it to 
keep its ban in place until it can justify it using better scientific methods, albeit with the 
understanding that such a justification has to occur within a reasonable period of time.92 
The United States disagrees, of course, with the EC’s interpretation of the WTO’s Beef 
Hormones decision, but none of the parties has argued that a violation of a WTO 
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obligation is permissible provided the injured party can retaliate by suspending market 
concessions.93  
An argument that has been raised against specific performance in international 
trade agreements involves the reality that trade agreements are, by their very nature, 
incomplete contracts.94 In other words, because trade negotiators cannot foresee all future 
contingencies that might constitute violations of a WTO rule, states will often face 
circumstances ex post that they did not anticipate would be addressed by the agreement.95 
For instance, a state might find itself later in a position where it would face enormous 
domestic political costs if it does not violate its treaty commitments, but it might have 
been very difficult to anticipate that situation ex ante. In such circumstances, the 
proponents of efficient breach argue, states should feel free to violate their WTO 
commitments when compliance would otherwise be “politically infeasible,”96 provided 
that compensation or retaliation is available to the state[s] injured by the breach. Because 
specific performance would force states to comply even when the political costs of 
compliance are extraordinarily high, the argument goes, a compensation approach is 
preferable. 
The argument that the GATT and the other WTO trade agreements are 
incomplete contracts seems somewhat indisputable. Indeed, uncertainty about future 
contingencies is likely to be a feature of any international agreement where states face a 
cooperative dilemma. It is not at all clear, however, that the enforcement of reciprocal 
trade obligations is best served by encouraging an efficient breach approach. Indeed, the 
flip side of specific performance—states tenaciously violating their trade commitments 
whenever they are willing to bear the retaliation costs—would very likely result in trade 
wars and would undermine the credibility of the WTO’s enforcement mechanism. In the 
Bananas dispute, for instance, several United States legislators voiced strong frustration 
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with the WTO dispute resolution process in the face of the EC’s non-compliance with the 
WTO ruling in that case.97  
There are two more effective ways of dealing with the problem of incompleteness 
in international agreements: the first is to allow the parties to renegotiate their trade 
commitments under various provisions of the GATT;98 the other is to encourage state 
parties to exercise restraint and avoid bringing “politically loaded” or sensitive cases 
before the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism.99 Interestingly, states seem to have 
adopted both of these approaches to deal with the uncertainty of domestic political 
pressures in trade disputes. For instance, Garrett and Smith have observed that with 
respect to renegotiation, the United States and the EC agreed in the 1994 Uruguay round 
to exclude agricultural subsidies from legal challenge until December 2003, with the 
understanding that further negotiations on agricultural subsidies would continue once the 
agreement expires. 100 Admittedly, not all politically loaded trade disputes may be 
amenable to renegotiation,101 but states also have the option using diplomatic outlets 
rather than burdening the WTO with politically intractable disputes. Indeed, in 1998, the 
WTO’s Director-General advised states to try to resolve more disputes through 
diplomatic channels and warned that asking the WTO to handle politically sensitive 
                                                 
97 See Paul Blustein, U.S., EU Reach Pact on Bananas, WASH. POST, April 12, 2001, at E1.  
98 Article XXVIII of the GATT explicitly provides for renegotiation by allowing nations that seek to 
withdraw concessions to so provided that they negotiate compensatory concessions to other affected states 
if possible, but if not, the affected states are allowed to suspend an equivalent amount of concessions. See 
GATT, supra note 1, art. XXVIII. Article XIX of the GATT also authorizes states to adopt temporary 
measures that would otherwise be GATT-inconsistent in order to protect distressed import-competing 
industries. See id. at art. XIX. Yet another form of “renegotiation” may take place when states reach a 
tentative agreement on certain issues but agree to revisit such issues in the future. See Joel Trachtman, The 
Domain of WRO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333, 351 (1999) (observing that incompleteness of 
treaty specifications may be the result of a political decision “to agree to disagree for the moment in order to 
avoid the political price that may arise from immediate hard decisions.”).  
99 Because of the political sensitivity of many “trade and” issues, such as those that implicate 
environmental and security issues, some commentators have argued that the WTO should invoke use 
judicial avoidance techniques like the political question doctrine when asked to address such issues. See, 
e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 733, 754-61 (1999). 
100See Geoffrey Garrett and James McCall Smith, The Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement, UCLA 
International Institute, Occasional Paper Series, (July 31, 2002), at 13.  
101 See Sykes & Schwartz, The Economic Structure, supra note 75 at 192 (arguing that tariff 
renegotiations would not address the EC’s concerns in the Beef-Hormones dispute). 
 36
issues that were “not central to its work” would not only be “a recipe for failure[,] [i]t 
could do untold harm to the trading system itself.”102  
The adjudication avoidance strategy seems to be the approach taken by the EC in 
its challenge to the United States Helms-Burton law, which penalizes certain foreign 
companies doing business in Cuba. Facing a credible threat by the United States that it 
would boycott the proceedings and refuse to comply with any WTO recommendations 
should it lose, the EC decided to settle the dispute with the United States. In its 
submission to the WTO, the United States invoked the political question doctrine in 
arguing that the WTO lacked competence to adjudicate on the legality of the Helms-
Burton law.103 After the WTO rejected those arguments, the United States openly 
threatened to boycott the proceedings.104 Indeed, the threat was credible enough that 
trade experts voiced concern that the legitimacy of the WTO would be undermined if the 
dispute were to proceed to the decision phase.105  
The United States’ stance in the dispute over the Helms-Burton legislation seems 
inconsistent with the notion that the WTO embraces an efficient breach approach. If 
efficient breach were an option available to disputants, then one would expect United 
States to proceed with the case with the understanding that if it lost it could simply 
compensate the EC or face retaliatory sanctions. Moreover, the EC’s willingness to back 
out of the lawsuit, rather than risk the credibility of the WTO, suggests the superiority of 
adjudication avoidance to an efficient breach approach. In any event, Garret and Smith 
have documented numerous other instances where state parties have chosen to avoid 
bringing cases to the WTO where domestic political pressures would make compliance 
with WTO recommendations difficult.106  
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B.  The Role of Equivalence in the WTO’s Retaliation Scheme 
The WTO’s enforcement mechanism provides that retaliatory measures shall be 
“equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.”107 Various commentators have 
seized upon this language to argue that the DSU endorses an efficient breach approach.108 
If the member states of the WTO had preferred specific performance, the argument goes, 
they would have provided for sanctions that were more severe than “equivalent” 
retaliatory measures.109 One problem with this argument is that under the domestic 
contract analogy, increasing the level of damages beyond that provided by expectation 
damages regime would simply result in a liquidated damages scheme. By definition, 
however, liquidated damages is not specific performance. Indeed, courts have routinely 
held that liquidated damages provisions that are designed to compel performance are 
non-enforceable. 110   
A more significant problem with this argument is that it overlooks the reality that 
the concepts of reciprocity and equivalence are pervasive throughout international law, 
and are not just features of the GATT/WTO framework. More importantly, the 
prevalence of these concepts in international law appear to reflect the reality of the 
asymmetries of power in international relations and the need to control the escalation of 
conflict in international disputes, rather than any endorsement of a notion of efficient 
breach.  
The notions of reciprocity and equivalence in international law are not of recent 
vintage. As early as 1948, a commentator had proclaimed the notion of reciprocity as one 
of the basic principles of international law.111 More recently, Elizabeth Zoller has argued 
that reciprocity “is a condition theoretically attached to every legal norm of international 
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law.”112 Thus, we find instances of reciprocity operating in situations as diverse as the 
Soviet-American détente of the 1970s,113 international disputes over airline routes,114 the 
legality of the diversion of an international water-way,115 and the legality of the United 
States’ military intervention in Vietnam.116 In 2001, the International Law Commission 
(ILC) formally adopted the concept of reciprocity or countermeasures as part of its 
articles on the implementation on state responsibility.117 More recently, WTO arbitrators 
have explicitly adopted the ILC approach in determining the appropriate level of 
retaliation necessary to induce compliance by the scofflaw state.118 Even though 
reciprocity and equivalence apply to myriad other situations in international law, no one 
would suggest that it reflects international law’s preference for an efficient breach 
approach, especially as applied to armed conflict situations.119  
 The pervasive role of reciprocity in international law is not so difficult to 
understand. The lack of a centralized enforcement mechanism in the international 
community of states means that states often have to rely on self-help measures to achieve 
compliance. Anthropologists have also shown that reciprocity or a tit-for-tat approach is 
also very common in primitive social orders that lack formal enforcement and dispute 
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117 See Bederman, supra note 109 at 819. 
118 See Brazil-Canada Arbitration Decision, supra note 86, at para 3.44. 
119 One notable exception to the application of retaliation, however, involves obligations affecting 
human rights or “other obligations affecting peremptory norms of general international law.” Bederman, 
supra note 109 at 827; see also Zoller, supra note 112 at 26. In other words, retaliation does not apply to 
those obligations that states owe to each other regardless of the other party’s performance. Such erga omnes 
obligations of states encompass practices as varied as the prohibitions against slavery, racial discrimination, 
genocide, and torture. See Zoller, supra note 112 at 26.  
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resolution mechanisms.120 As Robert Axelrod has argued, in such environments 
characterized by the absence of hierarchy, tit-for-tat or reciprocity is the best strategy for 
inducing cooperation among egotistical actors.121 Reciprocity’s success as a cooperative 
strategy in non-zero sum games may have a lot to do with both its “clarity” and the fact 
that is collectively stable across time.122 In other words, a reciprocal strategy makes each 
party aware in advance of the possible consequences of defection.  
  The notion that negative reciprocity should involve equivalent or commensurate 
suspension of obligations is also not surprising. Since negative reciprocity or retaliation 
involves exchanging “wrong for wrong,” there was always the implicit risk that the 
strategy could escalate into a feud in which all parties could be made worse off.123 In 
addition, there was also the concern that any “self help” remedial scheme would likely be 
subject to abuse by powerful states.124 In any event, almost all reciprocity measures in 
international law require that a retaliatory action be roughly equivalent to the amount of 
the injury inflicted.125 Indeed, precisely because of the conflict escalating risk associated 
with negative reciprocity, Axelrod suggested that a better enforcement strategy would be 
to return “nine-tenths of a tit for a tat.”126 In this framework, however, the utility of the 
strategy is not that it any way compensates the injured party, but that it provides 
sufficient incentives to each party “not to try gratuitous defections.”127 Most recently, a 
WTO arbitration panel reaffirmed that the goal of an “equivalent withdrawal of 
                                                 
120 See Zoller, supra note 112 at 14 (observing that “in primitive societies, reciprocity as the central 
principle of life”).  
121 ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 136-39 (1984). 
122 See id. at 118-19, 122-23. 
123 See id. at 138.  
124 See Oscar Schachter, Dispute Settlement and Countermeasures in the International Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 471, 472 (1994).  
125 See Zoller, supra note 112 at 22 (“The limits of reciprocity are the limits of equivalence”); Keohane, 
supra note 113 at 8 (“Despite the impossibility of determining exact equivalence, some degree of 
equivalence is integral to the meaning of reciprocity”).  
126 Axelrod, supra note 121 at 138. 
127 Id.; see also Brazil-Canada Arbitration Decision, supra note 86, at para. 3.44 (“We conclude that a 
countermeasure is ‘appropriate’ inter alia if it effectively induces compliance.”).  
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concessions” is to provide sufficient incentives to induce the scofflaw state to abandon its 
illegal actions, and not to compensate the injured party for its damages.128 
In addition to conflict escalation concerns, there is another good reason why 
equivalent retaliation in international trade disputes is a desirable enforcement strategy: it 
is fair and equitable given the existence of asymmetric trading volumes among WTO 
members. Any enforcement strategy that gives states the power to retaliate by suspending 
more than equivalent trade concessions would impose an unfair burden on states with low 
volumes of trade concessions. To illustrate, let us assume that both states B and C have 
suffered an equivalent amount of harm from state A’s refusal to comply with its trade 
commitments, let us say $20 million. Let us also assume that the total amount of state 
trade concessions that state B has offered to state A is $140 million and state C’s total 
amount of trade concessions to state A is $30 million. Finally, let us assume further that 
both states C and B have been granted the authority to retaliate against state A by 
suspending trade concessions equal to two times the amount of injury they have each 
suffered, that is $40 million. In this picture, state C is at a disadvantage because it can 
only suspend up to $30 million worth of trade concessions whereas state B, which suffered 
the same level of injury as state C, can easily afford to suspend trade concessions of up to 
$40 million. Thus, if we had a trade enforcement regime that allowed “more than a tit for 
a tat,” it would necessarily be unfair to states that do not have a significant volume of 
trade concessions.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Using the tools of public choice analysis, this Article examines the interaction of 
domestic interest groups and the WTO retaliation mechanism and argues that this 
interaction provides significant benefits that are lacking in alternative remedial schemes. 
First, by penalizing powerful export interest groups in a scofflaw state, retaliation enables 
                                                 
128 See Brazil-Canada Arbitration Decision, supra note 86, at para. 3.54 (“[I]f the actual level of 
nullification or impairment is substantially lower than the subsidy, a countermeasure based on the level of 
nullification or impairment will have less or no inducement effect and the subsidizing country may not 
withdraw the measure at issue.”).  
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political actors in scofflaw states to internalize the costs of defection from their free trade 
commitments. Second, the presence of protectionist interest groups in the injured state (or 
more correctly, the perception of the presence of such groups) may powerfully influence 
the injured state’s ability to make credible threats to retaliate. This Article also suggests 
that uncertainty about each state’s retaliation costs makes retaliation a credible 
enforcement strategy even when states have varying levels of commitment to 
protectionist policies.  
 Finally, this Article contends that the significant role of uncertainty in this model 
suggests that specific performance, and not compensation, should be the goal of the 
WTO’s enforcement mechanism. As a descriptive matter, attempts to interject 
contractual notions of compensation and efficient breach into the WTO’s enforcement 
mechanism are wrong or misleading. This is because the legal system that characterizes 
the international trade regime is too rudimentary to admit of such domestic contract 
analogies. More importantly, as a normative matter, this Article concludes that the 
WTO’s goals of market liberalization would be better attained through a specific 
performance approach: first, specific performance preserves the uncertainty that is 
integral to the functioning of the WTO’s enforcement mechanism; second, specific 
performance is the only remedy that is actually of use to the export groups in the injured 
states—the parties actually injured by a scofflaw state’s breach of its obligations.  
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